Normative Demonstration in Constitutional Democracy: An Expression of Political Love-Recognition by Verhaak, Sjors
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normative Demonstration in Constitutional Democracy:  
An Expression of Political Love-Recognition 
 
 
Honors Research Thesis 
 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Graduation “with Honors Research 
Distinction in Political Science” in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio State University 
 
 
By 
Sjors F. Verhaak 
 
 
The Ohio State University 
April 2018 
 
 
Project Advisor: Michael A. Neblo, Ph.D., Department of Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 The zeitgeist of contemporary American politics was thrown in sharp relief by the events 
in Charlottesville on August 11th and 12th, 2017. The demonstrations and eventual violence 
shocked a nation that prides itself on democracy and freedom of expression.  A group of far-right 
demonstrators, including white supremacists and neo-Nazis, gathered to protest the removal of 
the statue of a Confederate war general, which the City Council of Charlottesville had voted to 
remove. The far-right demonstrators were met by a broad coalition of counter-demonstrators, 
including college students, Christian groups, Socialists, and Antifa movement members. 
Escalating rhetoric and violence between the far-right demonstrators and counter-demonstrators 
culminated in a man driving his vehicle into a crowd of counter-demonstrators killing one, 
injuring 19, and leaving behind several questions. How did these demonstrations escalate? What 
could have been done differently? And what made the violence so prevalent? The answers to 
these questions are not simple, and in the process of answering them, we will find a host of other 
questions to explore. Keeping this in mind, we should begin by attempting to outline a tentative 
framework for interpreting these events. 
 The demonstrations in Charlottesville seemed from the outset fated to violence as groups 
with opposing beliefs gathered and manifested their ideological opposition physically. The 
physical nature of demonstrations lends itself toward an almost inevitable association of 
demonstrations with violence. This association was given further fuel at Charlottesville and 
demonstrations are generally viewed with a certain element of unease and distrust. In democratic 
theory, demonstrations seem, at first glance, to be a fairly anti-normative process of democratic 
participation. This is due to the demonstrators expressing a message primarily through their 
bodily presence, which when contrasted with verbal discourse, seems to be a less stable and 
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rational mode of expression that contains a greater possibility of violence. Yet, despite this 
intuition, demonstrations are still considered an integral part of a healthy constitutional 
democracy, requiring constitutional protection. These two conflicting impulses leave 
demonstrations in a conceptual limbo, both within and without normative democratic theory. 
Leaving demonstrations in this conceptual limbo, and thus lacking an understanding of 
demonstrations aligned with normative democratic theory, leaves us unable to adequately grasp 
and deal with the potential of violence that accompanies the tension between method and 
purpose in demonstrations. Furthermore, a framework that draws on this analysis can allow us to 
reconcile the democratic goals of a demonstration and its physical anti-deliberative methods to 
provide a justification for demonstrations and understand how demonstrations can serve 
democratic political goals.  
To normatively integrate demonstrations into democratic theory requires understanding 
demonstrations as a link between democratic theory and struggles for recognition. The 
relationship between struggles for recognition and democratic theory have been explored 
extensively in abstracto.1 However, demonstrations provide a concrete example of struggles of 
recognition being linked by social psychological mechanisms to “good” democratic outcomes. 
These social psychological mechanisms manifest themselves in an expression of political love-
recognition which attains its political nature through uniting with a normative claim, 
predominately one in a struggle for respect or esteem recognition. This connection intersects at 
the socialized nature of the individual and can provide a framework for understanding these 
demonstrations that play a significant role in the process of democratic opinion-formation.  
 
                                                          
1 Onni Hirvonen and Arto Laitinen, “Recognition and Democracy – An Introduction.” Thesis Eleven 134, no. 1 
(2016): 3–12.  
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2. Literature Review 
 Demonstrations, as a distinct analytical concept have not been defined, so they tend to 
fall into broader taxonomies that differ depending on the field of study. I will outline where 
demonstrations fall in the lexicon of the various social sciences to start the process of delineating 
demonstrations as a distinct analytical concept. 
In politics, demonstrations are generally either associated with acts of civil disobedience 
or the legal exercise of the right to assemble. My focus is primarily on demonstrations as an 
exercise of the right to assemble in order to contribute to democratic opinion formation; 
however, it is useful to briefly understand how this lies in relation to civil disobedience. The 
literature on civil disobedience is primarily concerned with the supralegal justification of an 
illegal but morally justified act. Rawls defines civil disobedience as a politically motivated, 
public, nonviolent and conscientious breach of law undertaken with the aim of bringing about a 
change in the aforementioned law.2 Rawls sets out three main conditions for engaging in civil 
disobedience: the injustice must be significant and severe; other avenues of political participation 
have been exhausted; and engaging in civil disobedience is undertaken with an understanding 
and respect for the just constitution. These three main conditions for civil disobedience, as we 
will see, do come up again in regards to demonstrations, not as conditions, but rather, as germs 
of the framework of analysis for demonstrations. The distinction between civil disobedience and 
demonstrations are clear. While demonstrations can be a form of civil disobedience, to 
understand demonstrations as a normative concept requires a different source of justification 
which is derived from a more fundamental element of the democratic state, namely the right to 
assemble, which is inscribed in all democratic constitutions.  
                                                          
2 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1999), 320. 
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In a constitution authored by and for citizens, there are certain fundamental rights that are 
guaranteed to every citizen. I find the best justification for this conception of a constitution 
authored by and for citizens is based on Habermas’s discourse-theoretic justification of basic 
rights. In Habermas’s justification of basic rights, the way legal subjects become authors of their 
legal order is through “basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in the process of opinion 
and will formation in which citizens exercise their political autonomy and through which they 
generate legitimate law”.3 These basic rights include, amongst others, the freedom of assembly 
and association. It is from this right to assemble and associate that demonstrations begin to arise 
as a distinct concept. Demonstrations are a way of participating in the process of opinion 
formation, which ultimately generates legitimate law. Yet, it is clear that demonstrations are 
distinct from the standard method of opinion formation, debate and discourse, in the public 
sphere.  
The distinct characteristics of the demonstration stem from its existence as a physical 
phenomenon, which gives rise to unique mechanisms related to that physicality. In particular, 
demonstrations are subject to crowd phenomena, a field of study in social psychology. Research 
on crowd phenomena can be traced back to Le Bon’s book, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular 
Mind, written in 1896. Le Bon views primarily crowds as a force of destruction. This cynical 
perspective is based on his concept of submergence, which Le Bon uses to explain how crowds 
behave. According to Le Bon, individuals that become submerged in crowds lose both internal 
and external restraints on their behavior. Since individuals in a crowd are indistinguishable from 
each other they lose a sense of individual responsibility and thereby a sense of conscious 
responsibility, which is then replaced by a collective unconscious. The crowd is then likely to 
                                                          
3 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Translated by William Rehg, (MIT Press, 1992), 123.  
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blindly follow impulses that arise from this collective unconscious, due to a lack of conscious 
responsibility. Le Bon’s analysis of crowd phenomena reflects the basic impression that crowds 
are more barbaric than individuals and that crowds and demonstrations should not be trusted as 
rational or effective methods of democratic participation.  
Although this model of submergence has been almost entirely discarded, Reicher, Spears, 
and Postmes argue in developing their Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Phenomena 
(SIDE), that Le Bon’s broader conceptual legacy of understanding the crowd as a loss of identity 
still influences the study of crowd phenomena. While Le Bon viewed the crowd as a functioning 
through a loss of identity that led to uncontrolled behavior, the SIDE Model challenges the 
understanding of crowds as of a loss of identity. The SIDE model rejects the desocialized subject 
that has persisted from Le Bon’s early studies of crowd phenomena. Rather, the SIDE model 
argues that there is no loss of identity, but an increase in the salience of the social aspect of a 
person’s identity.  The SIDE model rejects the desocialized subject and instead analyzes crowds 
based on a social understanding of self-hood. This is based on self-categorization theory, where 
different identities become salient under different circumstances.4 Rejecting the loss of identity in 
crowd phenomena is a key shift showing that crowd phenomena function not based on a loss of 
personal identity, but rather based on the increased salience of the social identity of the 
individual. To summarize the SIDE model: “the crowd is in the individual just as much when 
alone, if not more so”.5 Consequently, crowds can no longer be understood as fundamentally 
irrational. By reconceptualizing the crowd as individuals who have not lost their sense of 
                                                          
4 John C Turner Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory, (New York, NY, USA: B. 
Blackwell 1987). 
5 Stephen D. Reicher, Russell Spears, and Tom Postmes, "A social identity model of deindividuation phenomena." 
European Review of Social Psychology 6, no. 1 (1995): 161-198, 191. 
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identity, we can ascribe a certain rational functioning to crowds that can be understood through 
group social psychological phenomena and the political theory of recognition.  
The increased salience of social identity in crowds means that certain group effects begin 
to materialize. These group effects tie the normative function of the demonstration in the public 
sphere to the normative message of the demonstrators. Specifically, Intergroup Emotion Theory 
(IET) posits that when social identity is salient, appraisals of certain situations or events relevant 
to that particular social identity will trigger certain emotions.6 IET is based on an appraisal 
theory of emotion wherein our appraisals of situations and events cause an affective response.7 In 
the context of a demonstration, where social identity is salient, IET shows that the demonstrators 
are affectively connected through their shared social identity. This affective response in the 
context of a social group is key to understanding the normative content of demonstrations as part 
of a struggle for recognition.  
 The socialized conception of selfhood and the insights introduced in the SIDE and IET 
models are deeply connected to the political theory of recognition through both group emotions 
and trust-relations. Axel Honneth develops his politics of recognition from a psychology of 
recognition that has intersubjective mutual recognition of love at the core of his psychology of 
the subject. Love relations such as friendships, parent-child relationships, and intimate 
relationships are the first stage of a reciprocal recognition that establishes a relation-to-self in 
which people acquire basic confidence in themselves. Being loved or receiving love-recognition, 
in Honneth’s view, leads to a feeling of self-confidence; which is conceptually prior to both 
respect-recognition, which relates to legal relations, and esteem-recognition, which relates to 
                                                          
6 Thierry Devos, Lisa Silver, and Diane Mackie, Experiencing intergroup emotions, In: From Prejudice to Intergroup 
Emotions: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups. (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2002) 112. 
7 Klaus R. Scherer, Angela Schorr, and Tom Johnstone. Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, 
Research. (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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communities of value. The psychological need for self-confidence and physical integrity, as a 
practical relation to self, is initially established through the experience of love and is then, 
following David Owen’s expansion of the psychological maintenance of self-confidence, 
sustained through our relations of trust with the physical and social world.8 Trust-relations and 
affective emotions are fundamental constituents of both the political theory of recognition and 
demonstrations. Demonstrations are deeply tied to struggles for recognition both as overt claims 
for recognition of respect or esteem but also in a profound and affective psychological sense that 
is vital to the foundations of Honneth’s political theory of recognition.   
 
3. Defining Normative Demonstration 
Having outlined the contours of demonstration, I can proceed with a tentative definition 
of demonstrations. Specifically, for present purposes, I define demonstration as: a public 
gathering of a group of individuals with the intent to express a certain collective viewpoint and 
thereby participate in the process of democratic opinion formation.  
This definition includes a number of significant elements that I would like to draw 
attention to. First, a demonstration must be a public gathering which necessarily eliminates any 
sort of exclusive gathering of individuals. Thus, the demonstration must occur in a common or 
public space, such as a park or the street. The right to assemble, as a legal right, refers to the right 
to assemble in the public and since a demonstration is at a very rudimentary level, the physical 
manifestation of the right to assemble, it follows, that it must occur in the public. Secondly, a 
group of people requires a minimum of 2 individuals as per social psychological conventions, to 
                                                          
8 David Owen, "Self-government and ‘democracy as reflexive co-operation’, Reflections on Honneth’s social and 
political ideal." In Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory. (New York; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 290-320. 
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allow the formation of group dynamics.9 The formation of group dynamics needs to occur in 
order for group social psychological mechanism to take effect.10 Finally, the last and most 
important component of the definition is the intent of the demonstrators to participate in the 
process of democratic opinion formation. This means that the demonstrators, as I have identified 
them, subscribe to the democratic norms of nonviolence and are demonstrating with the goal of 
increasing the quality of the circulation of discourse in the public sphere. It is crucial to note that 
the demonstrators are not trying to subvert democratic processes, but are demonstrating with the 
intent of improving the quality of political opinion formation by bringing previously excluded 
arguments and information into the public sphere. This is how demonstrations play a normative 
role in democracies. In order for the content of demonstrations to be considered normative, they 
have to make a claim as to how the world ought to be. This claim, as we will later examine, is 
generally a claim for respect or esteem recognition. However, demonstrations can only make this 
claim if they fall within the prescribed norms of the constitutional democratic state.  
At this point, perhaps a helpful clarification would be regarding what exactly normative 
is referring to, and what it means as applied to demonstrations. At the first level of analysis, 
normative refers to a sociological distinction often made in studies of collective action.11 This 
taxonomy distinguishes collective action, of which demonstrations are a subset, by whether the 
collective action occurs within or without the prescribed norms of the existing system. In the 
case of a constitutional democratic state, operating within the norms means participating in the 
process of opinion and will formation, and generally foregoing violence to people and property, 
                                                          
9 Paul A. Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research, (New York: Free Press, 1976). 
10 Although, for the analysis of normative demonstrations, more than the bare minimum of two individuals is likely 
necessary for the proper formation of group dynamics. 
11 Stephen C. Wright, Donald M. Taylor, and Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Relationship of Perceptions and 
Emotions to Behavior in the Face of Collective Inequality.” Social Justice Research 4, no. 3 (1990): 229–250. 
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whereas operating without the norms can generally be understood as undermining these norms 
through violence. If demonstrations are sociologically normative in democratic constitutional 
states, it leads to demonstrations being politically normative in the second level of analysis. By 
demonstrations operating within the norms of a democratic constitutional state, they take up their 
politically normative function of advancing a claim as to how things ought to be (normative 
content) and thereby contribute to the process of opinion formation (normative role). 
Demonstrations are thus politically normative, both in role and content. In order to help ensure 
politically normative demonstrations, which contribute to democracy and are non-violent, an 
understanding of demonstrations is invaluable. My definition of demonstrations includes this 
normative element both in the sense of ascribing to societal norms, as well as the more 
consequential sense of participating in the process of opinion formation.  
As I have conceived demonstrations, the demonstration is a nonviolent act with the 
express goal of democratic participation through the collective physical expression of normative 
claims, that are predominately for respect or esteem recognition. However, there are several 
things that are still unclear. Both the conditions under which people choose to demonstrate, and 
the connection between demonstrations and struggles for recognition remain unexamined. These 
aspects of a normative demonstration, as a method of improving the quality of information in the 
public sphere, require further investigation.  
 
4. A Functional Analysis of Demonstration 
An Empirical Overview 
 Prior to any further analysis of demonstrations, it will prove useful to show that 
demonstrations are empirically significant. To argue that a new framework is useful for the 
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examination of events, such as those that transpired at Charlottesville, would be bolstered by 
evidence that such an event was not isolated, but rather is part of a broader trend. If the events in 
Charlottesville are simply a deviation from a norm that can be explained by examining unusual 
and specific circumstances unique to Charlottesville, then the relative importance of an inquiry 
into demonstrations would be circumscribed. However, an empirical survey of participation in 
demonstrations reveals that this does not seem to be the case and the demonstrations at 
Charlottesville are a part of a more broadly significant phenomenon in western liberal 
democracies. There are a number of contemporary movements including the Black Lives Matter 
movement, LBGTQ and woman rights groups, along with various socialist groups that seem to 
be demonstrating frequently. Also, certain issues are increasingly being promoted in the public 
sphere through demonstrations, such as issues revolving around abortion, police violence, and 
gun control.12 The demonstrations at Charlottesville are not isolated and the general impression 
one receives of demonstration being a significant phenomenon is reflected by the data. This 
intuition of the contemporary significance of demonstration extends beyond current events in the 
United States and is part of a broader trend. 
 
Table 1. Participation in lawful demonstrations in Western countries 1974-2009 (in %) 
United States Great Britain West Germany 
1975 1981 1990 1999 2007 1974 1981 1990 1999 2009 1974 1981 1990 1999 2008 
11 12 15 21 17 6 10 13 13 15 9 14 25 22 26 
                                                          
12 It is interesting to note that the primary participants in demonstrations for increased gun control, in wake of the 
shooting at Majory Stoneman Douglas High School, have been under the age of 18. This provides an interesting 
piece of evidence for the claim that demonstrations are a method of participating in democratic opinion formation. 
These high school students, across the country, cannot vote and yet they are participating in demonstrations in order 
to make their voices heard and influence democratic opinion formation even though they cannot participate in 
democratic will formation. This is a striking example of the power of demonstration to give expression to, in a 
certain sense, excluded viewpoints in the public sphere. 
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The data in Table 1 is drawn from The Political Action Study,13 which examined eight 
Western democracies from 1974-1975, and from The World Values Survey (WVS).14 
Participants in the survey were asked about attending a lawful demonstration in the past year and 
could give a variety of responses indicating not only their participation in a demonstration, but 
also their general attitude toward participation in a demonstration. Examining the values in Table 
1, there is a general upward trend of participation in lawful demonstrations in Great Britain and 
West Germany. Looking at the figures for the United States shows demonstrations are 
significant, if not following the exact same upward trajectory. Table 2 contains the specific data 
collected by the WVS from 1981-2014 in the U.S. While the number of respondents in Table 2 
that said, they had participated in a demonstration does not necessarily show an upward trend, 
the respondents who said they might participate in a demonstration generally increased, and the 
number of participants who said they would never participate in a demonstration generally 
                                                          
13 Samuel H Barnes, and Max Kaase, Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, (Beverly 
Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979). 
14 World Values Survey, World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
Table 2. Attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations in United States (in %) 
 
1981-1984 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 
Have done 12 15 15 21 15 14 
Might do 36 42 42 53 53 55 
Would never do 46 39 39 24 29 30 
Missing; Unknown 0 0 0 0 2 0 
No answer 3 0 0 0 1 1 
Don´t know 3 4 4 1 0 0 
(N) 465 1839 1542 1200 1249 2232 
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decreased. Another more recent poll conducted by the Washington Post found that one in five 
adults had attended a “attended a political rally, speech, or campaign event/ attended an 
organized protest, march, or demonstration of any kind”.15 Taken altogether, this provides strong 
support to the statement that overall demonstrations are a significant phenomenon.  
Furthermore, contextualizing the events in Charlottesville as part of a broader trend 
among Western nations of demonstrating provides some substance to the claim that 
demonstrations are relevant and significant today and deserve specific focus and analysis as a 
distinct concept. Providing evidence that participation in demonstrations is a significant 
phenomenon, gives a practical motivation for engaging in a closer and more rigorous 
examination of demonstrations. To this end, it will be fruitful to examine the distinct features of 
demonstrations as physical methods of participating in democratic opinion formation.  
 
The Tactical Logic of Demonstration 
A distinct feature of demonstrations is that, as a method of participating in democratic 
opinion formation, they ultimately follow a logic of communicative rationality, wherein the 
demonstrations function in a manner oriented by a rationality, guided toward successful 
communication in the public sphere, in order to participate in political opinion formation. This 
does come with a caveat however, because demonstrations, due to their physicality, are still 
subject, in a certain sense, to a tactical logic stemming from the physical element associated with 
demonstrations. The physical expression of a message, using the body, has to contend with 
certain tactical considerations that accompany this physicality. An analysis of the tactical logic of 
demonstrations and the factors that contribute to this tactical logic will highlight important 
                                                          
15 “One in Five Adults Have Attended a Political Protest, Rally or Speech.” Washington Post, April 12, 2018. 
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aspects of demonstrations that do shape the normative content of demonstrations. The extra 
effort that must be generated to physically participate in a demonstration leads to certain tactical 
factors having an influence. These tactical factors have an influence through the process of 
determining whether to participate in a demonstration, especially, under what conditions 
demonstrations would be comparatively more effective than other forms of political 
participation. The factors that increase or decrease the likeliness of demonstration, which are 
impact and ease of access, do impact the occurrence of normative demonstrations. Throughout 
the following analysis of the tactical factors that contribute to the occurrence of demonstrations, 
it is important to note that the tactical logic of demonstrations is still guided by a communicative 
rationality in the final analysis. While the tactical logic of demonstrations does occur without 
immediate reference to the principles of communicative rationality, it does stem from the 
normative orientation of demonstrations toward the process of political participation. The impact 
of demonstrations is ultimately determined by the influence a demonstration has on the process 
of opinion and will formation. The ease of access to other forms of political participation is 
driven by determining which form of political participation is most effective for contributing to 
the public sphere. This is how the analysis of the tactical effectiveness of demonstrations is, in 
the final analysis, determined by the normative impulses of demonstrations. The first factor to 
examine is impact, which is strongly influenced by changes in the contemporary public sphere, 
and is insightfully illuminated through the concept of the public screen.  
 
The Factor of Impact 
 The factor of impact, that is the impact a demonstration has on the process of opinion 
formation, is a tactical consideration that influences when groups decide to demonstrate. The 
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greater the impact of the demonstration on the process of opinion formation, the more effective 
the demonstration will be in fulfilling its normative function. This tactical consideration of 
effectiveness is strongly influenced by the contemporary nature of our public sphere and how 
ideas disseminate through it. In response to the changes in mass media dissemination and 
consumption, DeLuca and Peeples introduce the concept of a public screen as a necessary 
supplement to the public sphere.16 They argue that technology has vastly expanded the amount of 
information that the citizen is exposed to and that this information is often transcribed in images. 
While we idealize the public sphere as a place of dialogue, often and even more so today, it is a 
place of the dissemination of “a constant current of images and words”.17 This constant current 
of dissemination is identified as the public screen. The public screen is where groups perform 
image-events for dissemination on mass media. An example of such an image-event is a 
demonstration and in fact, DeLuca and Peeples use the WTO protests in Seattle as the case study 
for their idea of the public screen. The idea of the public screen provides us with an 
understanding that the impact of demonstrations is high. The demonstration is an impactful and 
effective manner of disseminating a viewpoint and participating in the public sphere.  This 
change in the nature of our contemporary public sphere shows that the tactical effectiveness of a 
demonstration in regards to its impact on the public sphere and on opinion formation is high due 
to the ever-increasing number of screens in our lives that mediate what information enters our 
discourse. Simply put, the public screen increases the impact that a demonstration has today. An 
image-event such as a demonstration is a highly effective method for introducing information 
                                                          
16 Kevin Michael DeLuca & Jennifer Peeples, “From public sphere to public screen: democracy, activism, and the 
“violence” of Seattle”, Critical Studies in Media Communication, 19:2, (2002), 125-151. 
17 DeLuca & Peeples, “From public sphere to public screen”, 135. 
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into the circulation of discourse. However, the public screen only is helpful in illuminating one 
of the tactical factors that normative demonstrations are subject to. 
 
The Factor of Ease of Access 
An analysis of the tactical factor of ease of access refers to the ease of access which 
groups have to other forms of political participation. The demonstration is unique because it is 
the physical embodiment of an opinion, rather than the verbalized expression of it. This means 
that a demonstration is not the standard method of discourse and deliberation that is given 
conceptual primacy in theories of deliberative democracy. This unique feature of demonstrations 
means that there must be specific circumstances in which citizens believe that demonstration is 
the most effective method for expressing their viewpoint. In a democracy, state institutions are 
set up for the expression of democratic opinion; the most obvious being the vote, but also, the 
constitutional rights of free speech and expression. Quite simply, in a democracy, the path of 
least resistance to express oneself is through verbal discourse. Getting out and physically 
mobilizing with a group of people requires effort and putting body in harm’s way. We can 
reasonably infer from the relative increased effort required for a demonstration that if a collective 
is demonstrating they have a reason for doing so. This leads us to the factor of ease of access.  
  As has been shown, the overall tactical effectiveness of demonstrations has been 
increased through the changed nature of the public sphere, meaning the tactical factor of the 
impact of demonstrations is high. This suggests that, in a certain sense, the primary consideration 
groups will make when considering a demonstration is access to other avenues of democratic 
participation. Groups with decreased access to other avenues of political participation, or groups 
that have exhausted their attempts to participate through other avenues, are more likely to 
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demonstrate. This factor of ease of access contributes to a tactical logic of demonstrations that 
informs when a group will demonstrate. The most common contemporary issues that have low 
access to other methods of participation in the democratic opinion formation process are 
struggles for recognition. These struggles, by their very nature, have lower access to other 
avenues of participation because “the experience of social injustice is always measured in terms 
of withholding of some recognition held to be legitimate”.18 Since the recognition is being 
actively withheld, it is more likely to have difficulty being heard through the social and/or 
political institutions and structures that are withholding the recognition. More specifically, for 
example, if respect recognition, in the form of rights, is being withheld, the political institution 
that supports this is likely to be oriented toward preserving that withholding arrangement, 
making it more difficult for groups to effectively cause change through that same political 
institution. Take the case of police brutality and misconduct. Trying to directly alter police 
conduct through the same police department and local government that legitimizes that conduct 
is likely to be a challenging proposition. Therefore, the groups most likely to demonstrate are 
those that are engaged in a struggle for recognition such as religious, ethnic, or feminist groups. 
These are not the only groups that will demonstrate but, they are more likely to do so, because 
they are the most likely to have low ease of access to other methods of participation in the 
democratic opinion formation process.  
This leads us to two separate but important conclusions from the standpoint of the tactical 
logic of demonstrations, and the analysis of the factors of this tactical logic. The first is that the 
impact of demonstrations on opinion formation is high due to the public screen and the general 
effectiveness of demonstrations as an image-event. The rapid proliferation of screens in our daily 
                                                          
18 Axel Honneth, “Recognition and justice: Outline of a plural theory of justice”, Acta Sociologica 47.4 (2004): 351-
364, 352. 
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life makes us more likely to consume our information through images on these screens. Pictures 
and videos of demonstrations are more eye-catching than a statement put out by a group. This 
means people are simply more likely to turn to demonstration when they want to contribute to 
the democratic opinion formation process. Demonstrations are just more effective at ‘getting the 
job done’ than they used to be. 
The second conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the tactical factors of 
demonstrations is that due to the ease of access factor, the content of demonstrations will most 
often be determined by the groups with low ease of access to other methods of political 
participation. The groups that are most likely to have low ease of access to other methods of 
participation are those actively engaged in a struggle for recognition, due to the nature of 
struggles for recognition. We can therefore conclude that the normative claims being advanced in 
demonstrations will generally be claims for recognition.19 Having examined the empirical 
significance and tactical logic of demonstrations we can now proceed to the most consequential 
aspect of the analysis of normative demonstrations.  
 
5. Politics of Demonstrations 
A Tension between Method and Purpose 
The conclusions worked out in the last section clear the way for the most significant 
aspect of the analysis of demonstrations. So far, we have introduced the concept of a normative 
demonstration, which is both normative in the sense of conforming to the norms of a democratic 
society and normative in the sense of advancing a claim as to how the world ought to be by 
                                                          
19 It is important to note that groups not engaged in struggles for recognition can demonstrate as well, however, 
based on the contemporary analysis of the tactical factors of demonstrations, we do not generally find this to be the 
case. 
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participating in the process of democratic opinion formation. It has been shown empirically that 
participation in demonstrations is significant, and an analysis of the tactical logic of 
demonstrations, which focused on impact and ease of access showed that the impact of 
demonstrations in the public sphere has increased, and that the participants in demonstrations are 
primarily those who are engaged in struggles for recognition. This clears the way for an analysis 
of what makes demonstrations distinct and how through social psychological mechanisms, they 
function as a specific connection between struggles for recognition and normative democratic 
theory.  
What is distinctive about a demonstration as a method of participating in democratic 
opinion formation is that it contains a tension between its method and purpose, which in the final 
analysis, lends the demonstration its power. The purpose of the demonstration is to participate in 
the deliberative process of democracy by introducing or bringing greater attention to excluded 
viewpoints. It is a democratic activity concerned with increasing the quality of information in the 
public sphere. This purpose of the demonstration is at odds with the methods through which this 
purpose is achieved. The method of physical demonstration contains a very undemocratic 
element, namely, the possibility of violence associated with the physical gathering of individuals.  
 While due to the normative purpose of the demonstration, the non-violent norms of 
democratic activity are generally adhered to in the demonstration, there is always a possibility of 
violence associated with a physical presence. This physical presence associated with a non-
violent demonstration often provokes violence, whether from the state, demonstrators, or 
counter-demonstrations. The physical expression of opinion is a vulnerable enterprise because 
there is the possibility of another group undermining the nonviolent democratic purpose of the 
demonstration with an anti-democratic assault on the opinion expressed. This means that 
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demonstrating engenders the possibility of a physical undermining of the participation in the 
process of opinion formation, which is not the case in other methods of participating in the 
process of democratic opinion formation. However, in this vulnerability lies the power of the 
demonstration. Because a demonstration is the most vulnerable method of expressing a 
viewpoint and engaging in a liberal public sphere, it is paradoxically, the most powerful method. 
The possibility of violence stems entirely from the physicality of demonstrations, which requires 
a much closer examination in order to understand how demonstrations function and where they 
derive their power from. 
 
Crowd Phenomena in Demonstrations 
 The physical aspect of demonstrations does not only simply necessitate the possibility of 
violence; it also necessitates a host of other phenomena, specifically social psychological 
phenomena. The demonstration is ultimately a physical crowd and as such, is subject to crowd 
phenomena. In examining these crowd phenomena, which demonstrations are subject to, we will 
draw closer to a connection with Honneth’s concept of love-recognition. However, first we 
should understand the crowd phenomena in a demonstration and what role they play.  
One of the primary crowd phenomena that occur in a demonstration is the increased 
salience of social identity. Reicher, Spears, and Postmes have developed the Social Identity and 
Deindividuation (SIDE) Model to describe the phenomena of deindividuation in crowds. Their 
model, supported by meta-analyses and experiments, show that deindividuating circumstances 
produce an increase in the salience of social identities and an increase in adherence to group 
norms.20 The circumstances for conditions, which maximize the salience and expression of social 
                                                          
20 Reicher, Spears, and Postmes, "A social identity model of deindividuation phenomena." 161-198. 
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identity, per the SIDE Model, are immersion in a group, lack of personalizing cues, 
identifiability to ingroup, and a lack of identifiability to outgroups.21 These circumstances are 
maximized in crowds, per the authors. Crowds are the “one place where groups can express their 
full understanding of the world without having to censor themselves for fear of others”.22  
The increased salience of our social identity is based on self-categorization theory where 
our sense of identity changes depending on the context of our surroundings. In the context of a 
crowd, the salience of our social identity with the crowd is increased in significance. This rather 
straightforward effect of the salience of the individual’s social identity being increased in the 
crowd leads to several other psychological processes. As the salience of the social identity 
increases in a crowd, “interpersonal differences become irrelevant, and the similarities between 
oneself and other ingroup members move to the psychological foreground”.23 It is at this moment 
that the group membership acquires an affective component.  
This affective component is conceptualized in Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET), which 
states that “when a social identity is salient, appraisals of situations or events relevant to that 
particular social identity will also trigger emotions”.24 IET draws on appraisal theories of 
emotion where situations or events are appraised, to see if they favor or harm an individual’s 
concerns, goals, or motives. In the case of a crowd where social identity is salient, that appraisal 
of emotion means that individuals may not be personally concerned with a situation but will 
experience emotions about it because it may help or hurt their group.25 IET ultimately shows that 
being in a crowd such as a demonstration is an affective experience where the members of a 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 192. 
22 Ibid., 192. 
23 Devos et al. Experiencing Intergroup Emotions. 112. 
24 Ibid., 112. 
25 Ibid., 113. 
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group are connected to each other in a sense fundamental to their personality. The fundamental 
affective connection that the increased salience of social identity in a crowd brings about is 
connected at the psychological level to the concept of love-recognition.  
 
Love-Recognition and Trust-Relations 
The connection between love-recognition and demonstration is at the social 
psychological level. There are many parallels between how Honneth describes the process of the 
recognition of love and the social psychological processes we see in a demonstration. Honneth 
sees love-recognition as the “affirmation of independence that is guided—indeed supported by—
care”.26 As shown earlier, these demonstrations are usually organized to draw attention to some 
issue related to either (or both) modes of recognition: respect and esteem. The third of Honneth’s 
three modes of recognition is love, where we need to experience the “affectionate attention of 
concrete others”27 to experience self-confidence. This self-confidence is important as a relation 
to self and in maintaining an ongoing experience of ourselves as individuals.  This recognition of 
love comes from love relationships which “are constituted by strong emotional attachments 
among a small number of people” 28 and these emotional attachments are described by Honneth 
as “a communicative arc suspended between the experience of being able to be alone and the 
experience of being merged”.29  
This description of how mutual love recognition occurs is striking in its similarity to the 
relationship of the individual to the group, through the socialized nature of selfhood. In a crowd 
                                                          
26 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. (Cambridge, Mass: Polity 
Press, 1995), 107. 
27 Simon Thompson, The Political Theory of Recognition. A Critical Introduction (Polity, 2006), 25. 
28 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 95. 
29 Ibid., 105. 
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the individual forms a strong affective bond with other members of the group and this affective 
bond is formed through an internal increase in the experience of being merged with others 
through the increased salience of the social identity of the individual. The only part of the 
experience of being in a crowd that does not directly parallel Honneth’s description of mutual 
love recognition is the limited scope he sets out for love-recognition. This can be addressed, 
however through a broader understanding of Honneth’s concept of love-recognition.   
According to Honneth, one of the threats to love-recognition is the undermining of bodily 
self-confidence through physical injury, and as examples of this, Honneth gives torture and rape. 
However, this limited set of threats to love-recognition can be understood more broadly. Owens 
specifically takes issue with Honneth limiting forms of disrespect to love-recognition or “love-
disrespect” to exclusively physical integrity. While Owens acknowledges that basic self-
confidence, as a practical relation-to-self, is initially formed in the experience of love, he argues 
the maintenance of bodily self-confidence is interwoven into trust relationships. These relations 
of trust are with not only our bodies, but also with the physical and social world. This critique of 
Honneth’s conception of the limited scope of love-recognition to include trust relationships as 
necessary to the maintenance of bodily self-confidence is key to understanding how love-
recognition creates both vulnerability and power in demonstrations. If “basic self-confidence is 
at stake in relations of trust”30  then disruptions of these trust-relation would undermine bodily 
self-confidence and fundamentally undermine the psychological foundations of the individual.  
Honneth states that love-recognition should have a scope limited to our significant others 
from whom we draw from for this mode of recognition; however, if we apply Owens 
reformulation of love-recognition, we see that the demonstration is a unique situation that serves 
                                                          
30 David Owen, "Self-government and ‘democracy as reflexive co-operation’” 317. 
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as an exception to Honneth’s normally limited scope of love-recognition. Due to maximization 
of social identity in a demonstration, the salience of trust-relations between the demonstrators is 
increased and so the scope of love-recognition is briefly and powerfully expanded to include all 
members of the demonstration, as trust relations are formed amongst the demonstrators. Honneth 
says that physical violence damages the subject’s integrity, which undermines their bodily 
confidence, but in the demonstration, this is not limited to physical violence. This is because the 
demonstrators are united in “loving care for the other’s well-being in light of his or her 
individual needs”.31 Not only can physical violence to the individual undermine their self-
confidence as a practical relation-to-self, but perceived threats to the well-being of the other 
demonstrators can also threaten the maintenance of love-recognition. This is because when other 
demonstrators are threatened, which under the conditions of an expanded scope of love 
recognition we rely on for the maintenance of trust relations, this threatens the maintenance of 
our love-recognition in the demonstration. This increased salience of trust-relations makes the 
maintenance of love-recognition vulnerable and exposes the psychological foundations of the 
demonstrators. As Freud puts it, “we are never so defenseless against suffering as when we 
love”.32 In a demonstration, under the condition of an expanded scope of love-recognition, the 
demonstrators are vulnerable. However, this does not indicate the impotence of demonstrations, 
but rather, paradoxically, indicates where the demonstration derives its power.  
 
A Politics of Love-Recognition 
 The briefly and powerfully increased scope of love-recognition, due to affective 
connection amongst the participants in the demonstration and the increased salience of trust-
                                                          
31Thompson, The Political Theory of Recognition, 109.  
32 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 52. 
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relations forms the basis for the understanding of demonstrations as an expression of a politics of 
love-recognition. The idea of political love-recognition may seem counterintuitive due to its 
prepolitical conceptualization; however, love-recognition only obtains its political character 
when it is united with a specific claim in the context of a demonstration’s expanded scope of 
love-recognition. This specific claim is likely to be a claim for the types of recognition that 
Honneth theorized as explicitly political: respect and esteem. This understanding of 
demonstrations as an expression of political love-recognition explains both the power of 
normative demonstrations and the risk associated with these demonstrations.   
 Honneth sees the struggle for recognition as a form of political resistance, derived from 
an experience of disrespect that is accompanied by an affective sensation, which becomes an 
impetus for action. Honneth is stating that the emotions we feel when our recognition has been 
violated become the impetus for action and this works well for understanding struggles for 
recognition of respect and esteem, where the affective sensation that provides the motivation for 
action is not entirely devastating to the person. This is in contrast, however, to violations of love-
recognition, which Honneth sees as tantamount to ‘psychological death’. This places 
demonstrations, understood as an expanded form of love-recognition, in a very precarious 
position. How can there be an understanding of demonstrations as an expression of political 
love-recognition when the stakes of love-recognition are so high?  
The answer is found in returning to what Honneth identified as the impetus for political 
resistance. In the political theory of recognition, the affective component is key; the affective 
sensation provides the motivation for political action. In a demonstration, due to the increased 
scope of love-recognition, the fear of a “psychological death’, the fear of the rupture of the 
individuals understanding of self, provides an affective impetus for action. While any sort of 
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action motivated by actual psychological death would be absurd because an individual who does 
not have self-confidence as a practical relation-to-self could not participate in any sort of 
political activity, the fear of the possibility of psychological death can provide the affective 
motivation for action. This fear is generated by the risks posed to the demonstrator’s trust-
relations with the group and their physical bodies, that is associated with the expanded scope of 
love-recognition in a physical demonstration. That fear generates an impetus for action, which in 
the case of a demonstration, is demonstrating and uniting for the overt claim of the 
demonstration based on the desire to participate in democratic opinion formation. All normative 
demonstrations can thus be understood as an expression of political love-recognition, where the 
expanded scope of love-recognition provides a strong affective impetus for the advancing of a 
claim beyond the original affective impetus of the claim. This unification of love-recognition and 
a claim for recognition found in normative demonstrations suggests a way of understanding the 
tension between the method and purpose in a demonstration.  
Since a normative demonstration is advancing a claim based on the desire to participate 
in democratic opinion formation, its overt purpose is to participate in the political process. 
However, the discursive power of that claim is derived from the method of the expression of a 
politics of love-recognition. By understanding how a demonstration derives its discursive power 
in advancing a claim, we can now examine the conditions for a productive expression of political 
love-recognition integrated into normative democratic theory, instead of a “politics” of love 
recognition that devolves into violent action under the banner of democracy. Understanding the 
demonstration as an expression of the politics of love-recognition that advance an overt claim of 
a social group reconciles the overtly deliberative purpose of demonstrations with its method. 
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This understanding of demonstrations has several implications for encouraging ‘good’ 
democratic outcomes from normative demonstrations. 
 
6. Implications 
In a demonstration, the participants are tying their message and/or claim for esteem or 
respect recognition to their need for love-recognition and thereby the discursive power of their 
message in the public sphere becomes considerably more powerful. However, along with this 
increased discursive power comes an increased vulnerability due to the inherent vulnerability of 
a politics of love recognition. The understanding of the politics of demonstrations as an 
expression of political love recognition reveals several aspects of normative demonstrations that 
are politically relevant however, the concrete implications of this understanding still need to be 
examined. There are multiple facets of demonstrations that can be better understood in light of a 
politics of love-recognition. The first of these aspects is regarding participants in demonstrations.  
The participants in a demonstration are engaging in a normative democratic activity that 
has both a normative role and normative content. In light of the normative role of demonstrations 
in a constitutional democracy, demonstrators should orient themselves toward their ultimate goal 
of participation in the process of opinion formation. This then informs concrete actions the 
demonstrator should take. The participants in a demonstration should adhere to norms of non-
violence. As soon as the demonstrators abrogate themselves of the responsibility to avoid 
violence and the potential for violence increases, the democratic function of the demonstration is 
at risk. When the demonstrators in a demonstration becomes violent the normative content—the 
message of the demonstration—loses a significant portion, if not all of its legitimacy. In losing 
its legitimacy, the discursive power generated by the collective expression of a viewpoint is lost. 
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The raison d'être of a demonstration in a democracy is participating in the process of opinion-
formation. Violence by the demonstrators undermines the entire purpose of the demonstration 
and should be avoided as much as possible, without losing the potential for violence that gives 
the demonstration its power. When a demonstration is organized, all participants should be made 
aware of this goal of the demonstration and thus act accordingly. 
 Martin Luther King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail is helpful in discussing how 
participants ought to be made aware of the goal of the demonstration. King outlines the four 
basic steps to any nonviolent campaign: “collection of facts to determine whether injustices 
exist; negotiation; self-purification; and direct action”.33 While King is talking more broadly 
about nonviolent protest in the context of civil disobedience, these four steps offer an illustrative 
guide for participants in demonstrations. These steps can be translated to demonstrations in a 
fairly straightforward manner. The demonstrators should first collect the facts to determine 
whether their viewpoint is being underrepresented in the public sphere. Then, they should 
attempt other methods of participating in democratic opinion formation, which corresponds to 
negotiation. Next, the demonstrators should go through a process King calls self-purification. For 
King self-purification is essentially education and mental preparation, involving self-reflection 
on one’s motives, for the actual act of nonviolent protest. This education of demonstrators in 
light of a politics of love-recognition, involves the education of the normative goal of the 
demonstration (to improve the circulation of discourse in the public sphere) and how to best 
achieve that goal (through methods that do not undermine the legitimacy of the demonstrators). 
King’s final step in a nonviolent campaign is direct action, which in the case of the politics of 
demonstrations corresponds to demonstrating. The understanding of the goals of a 
                                                          
33 Martin Luther Jr. King, "Letter from Birmingham Jail," U.C. Davis Law Review 26, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 835-
852. 
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demonstration, or what King calls self-purification, guides the actions of the demonstrators in the 
actual act of participating in the demonstrations as well.   
The participants should not indicate a willingness for violence in the demonstration. This 
means that the participants in a demonstration should not carry weapons during the 
demonstration, especially not firearms.34 They should use signage that promotes their viewpoint 
and does not explicitly condone violence through the implicit or explicit usage of symbols and 
language associated with violence. Generally, the manner in which the demonstrators conduct 
themselves is important to avoiding violence because the conduct of the demonstrators can 
indicate a willingness or lack of a willingness for violence. While a demonstration is an 
expression of the freedom to participate in the democratic process and therefore cannot have 
these restrictions placed on them by the law, demonstrators will more effectively be able to 
promote their viewpoint in the public sphere when they avoid, as much as possible, the actuality 
of violence while retaining the potential for violence. Maintaining the potential for violence is in 
a certain sense a low standard that simply allows for there to be the potential of physical contact 
amongst the demonstrators or between opposing groups, whether that be opposing 
demonstrations or demonstrations and the state. The potential for violence is preserved as long as 
the threat of an actuality of violence is preserved, and the threat of violence will always 
necessarily exist in the physical expression of a collective viewpoint. Furthermore, practically 
speaking, any mass demonstration will have law enforcement officers in attendance who also 
provide a potential for violence. Law enforcement is another facet of demonstrations that the 
understanding of normative demonstrations has implications for.  
                                                          
34 One notable exception to this avoidance of symbols of violence in order to avoid delegitimizing the 
demonstration, is the Black Panthers Party’s armed patrols and demonstrations to monitor the Oakland Police 
Department and oppose police brutality. In this case, carrying weapons increased the discursive power of their 
message due to the relation of their symbols of violence directly to their message.  
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The projection of state power in the form of law enforcement is likely to be encountered 
by demonstrators. Law enforcement will necessarily show up at any mass demonstration and will 
project an aura of violence. However, this violence is different in character than violence 
stemming from the demonstrators, which is delegitimating to the demonstration, and this aura of 
police violence generally increases the discursive power of the demonstration.  Demonstrations 
have to be enforced with the understanding that the demonstrators are participating in a 
legitimate, important, and vulnerable activity and therefore enforcement has to be oriented 
toward encouraging normative demonstration and avoiding the actuality of violence. The 
enforcement of the demonstration must occur in a manner that encourages the nonviolent liberal 
norms that underpin the demonstration, along with an understanding of the susceptibility of 
demonstrations to escalation and violence. The state must ensure that demonstrations are handled 
in a manner that takes the vulnerability of the demonstrators into consideration. Police should 
also actively keep a safe space, or “neutral zone” between demonstrators and counter-
demonstrators, considering the collective’s susceptibility to violence, and should minimize the 
use of physical violence when at all possible because it will often only escalate to further 
violence. As the state responds to demonstrators with increasing violence, not only are they 
propagating violence amongst the demonstrators, they are also violating at a very basic level the 
demonstrator’s bodily self-confidence. The enforcement of demonstrations should occur with the 
acknowledgement of the fact that demonstrators are participating in a democratic process just as 
much as voters queuing up to cast their ballots. While, the specific details of the enforcement of 
these two methods of participating in democracy will naturally differ, the underlying 
understanding of both demonstrations and voting should be that the demonstrators and the voters 
are citizens engaged in a democratic process. Granted, the demonstration is, in a certain sense, a 
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more volatile democratic process but understanding demonstrations as an expression of the 
politics of love-recognition, provides the conceptual framework needed to properly enforce the 
demonstration. Not only is the participation in and enforcement of demonstrations informed by 
our understanding of demonstrations, the laws of the state regarding demonstrations are also 
informed.  
A demonstration is ultimately an act of participation in a democracy. It is an act that is 
required in healthy democracy as an important failsafe to groups who find themselves unable to 
participate through other discursive channels. The laws of a state should reflect the goals of a 
demonstration and allow the demonstration to effectively present its message. This means that, 
counterintuitively, the law must protect this inherent possibility of violence and risk to the 
demonstrators while setting up the ideal conditions for the demonstration to remain nonviolent. 
The law should have non-discriminatory regulations regarding protest permits. The law should 
also ban the possession of weapons at the demonstrations and the law should explicitly not 
condone the establishment of “free-speech zones”. These free speech zones cordon off the 
protestors and blunt the power of the demonstration. Free speech zones exist in order to protect 
the safety of either the protestors or other people attending the gathering. While protecting the 
safety of protesters and others is important, our understanding of the politics of demonstrations 
show that this defangs the demonstration of its discursive power. Not only does it almost entirely 
remove the potential for violence, it also often places the demonstration outside of the view of 
the media, severely curtailing the impact of the demonstration through the public screen. 
Outlawing free speech zones, however, does not mean that the police cannot control the 
demonstration and redirect it so that the demonstration does not interfere with the proceedings of 
a legitimate event. The police are justified in this enforcement of a demonstration because the 
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guiding principle of their enforcement is to help maximize the discursive power of the 
demonstration while minimizing violence and destruction. Using this calculus, free speech zones 
too significantly decrease the discursive power of the demonstration to justify the minimization 
of actual violence. The trade-off of a free speech zone does not follow from the understanding of 
demonstrations as an expression of love- recognition.  
While this is not an exhaustive survey of the implications of the politics of 
demonstrations they do show that an understanding of the politics of demonstrations has many 
practical implications for actual demonstrations which will ultimately help improve the quality of 
discourse in the public sphere and improve democratic function.    
 
7. Conclusion 
Looking back at the questions posed about the events in Charlottesville, they deserve a 
more in-depth analysis then can be provided here, but I can make a few brief points. First, using 
the concept of demonstration that I have explicated we can see that the reason the violence was 
so prevalent is no small part due to the expanded scope of love-recognition amongst both sets of 
demonstrators. An attack on one felt like an attack on the collective and the different normative 
claims the collectives stood for, causing both the escalation of violence and its prevalence. 
Secondly, another important contribution to the violence was the lack of awareness by protestors 
of the discursive purpose of their demonstration and the non-violence this purpose entails. This 
lack of knowledge caused conditions that made it easier for provocateurs to instigate violence 
between the groups and contributed to the escalation of violence. Using the concept of normative 
demonstration, we can see that certain groups amongst the demonstrators deviated extensively 
from the normative logic of demonstrations and thereby contributed significantly to the 
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violence.35 Lastly, the police did not protect the demonstrators who were adhering to nonviolent 
norms and thereby encouraged violence through their tacit acceptance. Further examination of 
the events at Charlottesville using the framework of demonstrations is required to provide us a 
clearer understanding of what occurred and how to prevent it from occurring in the future. 
Understanding demonstrations as an expression of political love-recognition unifies the 
tension between the method and purpose in demonstrations. The overt claim of the 
demonstration is understood as part of a process of participating in the political sphere, and the 
politics of love-recognition provides substance to that claim in a very fundamental manner to the 
participants of the demonstration. This deep, psychologically derived, substance of a claim 
advanced in a demonstration has its drawbacks primarily stemming from the danger of a deep 
affective response to a situation. If the expression of political love-recognition is threatened, then 
there could be a violent backlash. Understanding this provides us the conceptual tools in order to 
avoid this violence. Minimizing this risk while maximizing the discursive power of 
demonstrations guides our thoughts in this direction. In light of providing a justification for 
demonstrations, it is important to understand the power of the expression of political love-
recognition to cut through discourse and deliberation and make a powerful contribution to the 
circulation of discourse in the public sphere. The concept of the politics of demonstration, as an 
expression of political love-recognition, provides a useful critical tool for both critiquing and 
improving our contemporary democratic condition.  
Furthermore, this understanding of demonstrations fundamentally challenges the 
delineation of what can constitute the political in the political theory of recognition. By 
connecting democratic theory and the political theory of recognition in the understanding of 
                                                          
35 Among the most notable: Redneck Revolt, the Nationalist Front, and the Ku Klux Klan. 
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normative demonstrations as an expression of political love-recognition, a new area of research 
has opened up concerning both normative demonstrations and other potential instances of 
political love-recognition. For instance, we now know how normative demonstrations function in 
constitutional democracies; however, we do not understand how a more authoritarian public 
sphere would impact the analysis of demonstrations. This and other research questions deserve 
further exploration; but let us not forget, as we pursue these questions, the brute reality of the 
potential danger and benefits of demonstration that motivate this research.   
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